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Abstract—In this paper two cryptographic methods are intro-
duced. In the first method the precence of a certain size subgroup
of persons can be checked for an action to take place. For this we
use fragments of Raptor codes delivered to the group members.
In the other method a selection of a subset of objects can be
made secret. Also, it can be proven afterwards, what the original
selection was.
Index Terms—Presence of subgroup, Raptor codes, Decodabil-
ity, Private subset, Factoring of numbers, Election predicting,
Self-fulfilling prophecies
I. CHECKING THE PRESENCE OF A CERTAIN SIZE
SUBGROUP OF PERSONS
CONSIDER, that we have a group of persons. For anaction to take place, we require that at least s members
of the group are present. The action could be firing a weapon,
or we could perform some action for which we need a
subset of a certain size of board members of a company, or
just some action for which to take place we need to check
the presence of a subset of certain size of some interest group.
This checking of presence could be made by Raptor
codes (for Raptor codes, see [1]). We could deliver in advance
fragments of Raptor code to each member of the group. The
fragment size should be such that we obtain the needed key
(which is decoded from concatenated fragments) only if at
least s group members are present. From the properties of
Raptor codes it follows that we can recover the key with any
subset of size s of fragments.
In this paragraph we calculate the maximum number of
group members whose presence could be checked by this
method. Let s be the number of persons whose presece is
needed for an action to take place, and let k be the length
of the key (number of input symbols). s fragments of Raptor
code should be 1.1 · k in total length to be decodable with
very high probability. As we know from [2], 0.05 overhead
can make the code decodable. We require here 0.1 overhead
(this is the amount which is a design choice of at least some
companies for their Raptor codes [3]). Also, the total length
of s − 1 fragments of Raptor code must be less than k in
length for the code to be non-decodable. Let’s say that s− 1
fragments is 0.99 · k in length. With one output symbol, at
most one input symbol can be recovered. This is why it is
not possible to decode whole message with s − 1 fragments
or less. From these we get
⌊
total length of fragments
length difference between s and s-1 fragments⌋
= ⌊
1.1k
1.1k − 0.99k
⌋ = 10
which is the maximum number of group members whose
presence could be made required for an action to take place.
It should be noted that the group size is almost not
limited from above. The group could be for example the
population of a nation. The group members may carry the
coded fragments by memory sticks and the key is stored on
a computer where the memory sticks will be attached. The
group members can be even geographically distributed and for
example they attach their memory sticks to their computers
which are connected to Internet by a secure connection.
This scheme could be implemented also by passwords.
Raptor code method is better when passwords can not be
used for some reason, for example if their space requirement
is too large due to the big size of the group.
A drawback of this method is that if the key has to be
changed, then all the code fragments have to be changed also.
II. PRIVATE SUBSET OF OBJECTS
Let’s begin the description of this application with a case.
In Finland, for example, in national Lotto the customers guess
7 numbers out of 39. Let’s suppose that the Lotto customers
want to keep their selection of numbers secret, but send their
selection to the Lotto company. This can be done so that to
each of 39 Lotto numbers an integer i is assigned, which is
the product of two big random prime numbers j and k. Also,
an integer l 0..9 is assigned to i, which is formed as follows:
If the customer has selected number i, l is the mod 10 sum of
the digits of j and k. For example, if j and k are 327...3 and
615...7 then l is 3+2+7+...+3+6+1+5+...+7 (mod 10). In case
the Lotto customer has not selected number i then l is formed
so that we take the l calculated as above and add 1 to it and
take mod 10. In this way the customer has i and l associated
to each Lotto number 1..39 and he or she sends these to
the Lotto company. Because of computational difficulty of
factorization of composite numbers formed this way the Lotto
company can’t know j’s and k’s and so is not able to check
if they match with l to know if the corresponding Lotto
number is selected by the customer. The idea of a product
of large primes is from the well known RSA [4] public key
cryptography algorithm.
The Lotto company may send the file sent by the customer
back to the customer decrypted by the company’s private key
in RSA manner. This ”decrypted” file may serve as a receipt
from the company.
When the drawing of Lotto numbers have been done,
2the winning customers send their j’s and k’s to Lotto
company so that it can check if the customer has won.
Another application very similar with the Lotto example is
predicting the election results without telling a priori which
candidates he or she predicts to win. The correctness of the
prediction can be verified after the election result. This way
we can avoid the effect of self-fulfilling prophecies because
the prophecies will be kept secret. This method is applicable
to almost all situations where a subset of a set has to be
chosen and the selection has to be kept secret.
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